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This paper reexamines the issue of optimal capital income taxation in an endogenous 
growth model with overlapping generations. By assuming costly state verification for 
capital producing projects, we show that the presence of the information asymmetry creates 
inefficiency in the credit market by driving a wedge between the rate of interest and the rate 
of transformation. In this context, we further show that capital income taxation worsens the 
credit market distortions and, subsequently, induces greater adverse effects on growth and 
welfare. Taken together, our analysis suggests that the presence of informational frictions in 
the credit market introduces a rationale for more conservative taxation on capital income 
from both growth and welfare perspectives.  
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I. Introduction 
 
   The issue of optimal capital income taxation has long been a focal point of the public 
finance literature. Despite the extensive studies by many authors, the final verdict on this 
issue appears to still remain elusive. In the context of economic growth, on the one hand, a 
preponderant body of work has emerged in support of a zero or low taxation on capital 
income. For example, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) provide some pioneering studies in 
which the optimal tax on capital income is shown to be zero in the standard Ramsey-type 
growth model, thus shifting any burden of taxation towards labor.1 However, others have 
argued in overlapping generations models that taxation on capital income can potentially 
result in higher amounts of savings and investment (see, for example, Uhlig and Yanagawa 
1996 and Caballé 1998).2 These almost diametrically opposing results on capital income 
taxation seem to have arrived from the different modeling assumptions regarding the 
life-cycle considerations of agents in different models.  
   Within the overlapping-generations framework with finitely-lived agents, individuals 
need to save when they are young for their retirement consumption when they are old. This 
life-cycle consideration is, however, absent in the infinitely-lived agents framework of the 
Ramsey-type, where individuals are effectively always young since they live forever. In a 
standard overlapping-generations model, there are two competing effects of capital taxation 
on growth via savings. First, an increase in capital income taxation alleviates the need for 
labor income taxation and thus shifts income from the second period towards the first 
period in an individual's life-time (after-tax) income profile, resulting in more savings by 
the young for retirement purposes. Second, higher capital income taxation leads to lower 
returns on investment, and thus dampens agents' incentives to save. Provided that the 
interest elasticity of savings (or equivalently, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution) is 
sufficiently low – an assumption that accords well with many empirical estimates in the 
literature – raising capital income taxation will result in higher savings and hence faster 
growth. Therefore, the growth-maximizing taxation policy in this case is to set the tax rate 
on capital be as high as possible. In contrast, the absence of life-cycle considerations of 
                                                 
1
  When this line of enquiry is extended to the context of endogenous growth where both physical capital and 
human capital (labor) are reproducible factors, the literature shows that in general taxation on both capital 
and labor income reduces long-run growth (see, for instance, Lucas 1990; Rebelo 1991; Pecorino 1993; 
Jones et al. 1997; and Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini 1998). 
2
 These studies consider an overlapping-generations model in which government taxes both capital and labor 
income to support a constant public spending share of output, show that increasing the tax rate on capital 
income leads to higher economic growth under plausible parameterizations. In line with this result, Jones 
and Manuelli (1992) also find that a policy of income redistribution from the old to the young, which is akin 
to raising tax on capital, can increase growth.  
 2 
saving for retirement when agents are young, as in the infinitely-lived-agents framework, 
renders the first positive effect of capital taxation inoperative and hence implies that capital 
taxation only discourages savings, investment and growth. 
   In a recent paper, Ho and Wang (2007) consider an overlapping-generations model in 
which capital accumulation is subject to the adverse selection problem in the credit market. 
It was shown that, when the risk types of borrowers for capital-producing projects are 
unknown to lenders, capital taxation worsens the adverse selection problem and introduces 
an additional negative effect on growth. Consequently, it was found that the growth rate is 
not monotonically increasing with the tax rate on capital income, even under the 
assumption of zero interest-rate elasticity of savings. This suggests that, comparing to the 
results established in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballé (1998), the optimal taxation 
on capital is not to set it as high as possible.  
 The primary objective in the present paper is to reexamine the issue of optimal 
taxation on capital (versus taxation on labor) when physical capital is produced by risky 
projects which are partially financed externally through a credit market with asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders. Unlike in Ho and Wang (2007), where the 
adverse selection type of asymmetric information is considered, in the present model the 
source of information asymmetry stems from the privately observed project returns and the 
costly state verification by others. Since many different kinds of informational frictions are 
likely to be present in the real-life credit market, the relevance of the previous study would 
be rather limited unless its implications are proved to be robust to different specifications of 
informational structure. In the current setup, the costly state verification by lenders drives a 
wedge between the (expected) interest rates on loans and the opportunity cost of funds, as 
the equilibrium loan contracts require a positive probability of verification by lenders in 
order to maintain the incentive compatibility condition. This credit market inefficiency 
creates an adverse effect on capital formation, growth, and welfare, that is absent in the 
benchmark economy with full information. Furthermore, in contrast with Ho and Wang 
(2007) where the working population is comprised of only lenders, the present paper 
assumes that both lenders and borrowers are endowed with labor. In such a case, while 
borrowers can use their own wage income as internal funds for their investment projects, 
they also borrow externally from lenders (their wage income) through the credit market, at 
a higher cost due to informational frictions. As the co-existence of internal and external 
finance is a rather common feature of loan markets, the current setup thus brings an 
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additional dimension of realism to the model.3 
   Our main findings are as follows. First of all, we show that higher capital income 
taxation leads to a higher probability of verification in equilibrium. This result arises 
because increasing tax on capital income skews the incentives of a borrower toward "under 
reporting," rendering more frequent verification necessary to keep the borrowers’ incentive 
compatibility constraint binding. Thus, since verification is costly, capital income taxation 
generates an extra adverse effect on capital accumulation and growth. Assuming that 
government collects tax revenues from both capital and labor incomes, the credit market 
distortions induced by capital income taxation will tilt the optimal taxation policy in favor 
of a lower (higher) tax rate on capital (labor) income in the growth maximization calculus. 
Specifically, we find that both the optimal tax rate on capital income and the optimal 
growth rate in the economy are negatively related to the severity of asymmetric information 
in the credit market. Furthermore, the relationship between the optimal auditing probability 
and the severity of asymmetric information is also negative. Finally, our welfare analysis 
reveals that the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital is even smaller than its 
growth-maximizing counterpart, and is also deceasing in the severity of the credit market 
friction. 
 The current paper is also related to the following studies. Contrary to many standard 
results, Yakita (2003) argues in an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations 
that the inability of accumulating human capital in the last period of an individual's life 
renders a positive relationship between labor income taxation and growth.4 In a partial 
equilibrium analysis, Jacobs and Bovenberg (2004) examines factor income taxation in an 
overlapping generations model with endogenous human capital and shows that positive 
(possibly significant) taxation on capital will be optimal in order to alleviate the 
distortionary effect of wage taxation on human capital formation. In a Ramsey model with 
formal and informal sectors, Penalosa and Turnovsky (2005) shows that capital should be 
                                                 
3
 We follow Bernake and Gerter (1989) modeling borrowers’ wage income as the source of internal funds. In 
Joydeep (1998), however, internal funds take the form of bequests transferred from old borrowers to their 
off-springs.  
4
 When the cost of human capital investment takes the form of foregone wages as in Yakita (2003), a typical 
result in the infinite horizon framework is that labor income taxation does not affect long-run growth as it 
affects both the benefit and cost of human capital formation by the same proportion (see, e.g., 
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini 1998). In the framework with overlapping generations, the positive growth 
effect of wage tax obtained in this paper also runs contrary to those established in Uhlig and Yanagawa 
(1996) and Caballé (1998). The difference arises because the wage tax here also serves as a means of 
redistributing labor income from the old to the young, so that labor income taxation in this paper in fact 
works in favor of, instead of against, the young generation and hence leads to more savings (physical capital) 
as well as more time spent in accumulating human capital by the young. 
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taxed at least as heavily as labor to minimize the distortion in allocation of factors across 
sectors. By considering an infinite-horizon growth model with public capital and elastic 
labor supply, Chen (2007) finds that, while the growth effect of capital income taxation is 
ambiguous, labor income taxation is likely to lower growth. 
 In what follows, we first describe the model economy in Section II. We then derive the 
equilibrium loan contracts in the credit market under asymmetric information in Section III. 
The growth implications of the credit market equilibrium and the optimal tax policy are 
discussed in Section IV. We then conduct the welfare analysis of the taxation policy in 
Section V. Finally, Section VI contains some concluding remarks.   
 
II. The Model Economy 
 
    The model economy is composed of overlapping generations of two-period-lived 
agents. Each generation consists of a continuum of agents whose measure is normalized to 
one and it is divided into lenders and borrowers with equal size. While both a young lender 
and a young borrower are endowed with one unit of labor each, only the latter owns and 
runs a risky capital producing project. To maintain simplicity and clarity, it is assumed that 
both borrowers and lenders are risk neutral and consume only when they are old.5 
    A (young) lender supplies his endowed labor inelastically to earn wage income, which 
is then lent to a borrower in exchange for consumption goods in the next period. 
Alternatively, a lender has access to a default, inferior technology that converts one unit of 
his time t wage into ε units of time t+1 consumption goods with probability one. This 
alternative use of funds thus defines the opportunity cost of lending. Each (young) borrower 
first supplies his endowed labor inelastically to earn wage income for internal investment 
use; then next he operates an ex ante identical project, with both internal and external 
financing, that yields an uncertain amount of physical capital in the following period. For 
illustration purpose, we assume that these risky projects have the simplest return structure: 
they fail to produce anything with a probability pi  and produce a positive amount of 
capital, κ , per unit of investment with a probability pi−1 .6 Borrowers with successful 
                                                 
5
 Assuming agents only enjoy old-age consumption automatically implies that intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, as well as interest elasticity of savings, is equal to zero, and hence that the argument in Uhlig 
and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballé (1998) would apply. Thus, this assumption allows us to make the 
comparion between our result and theirs most transparent. Our analysis, however, can be extended to the 
case where lenders consume in both periods and their preferences are characterized by CRRA utility 
functions with a sufficiently low intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 
6
 Our analysis can be easily carried over to the more general case where a project yields two different positive 
amounts of capital with complementary probabilities.  
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projects will supply produced capital at the market rate, and hence derive capital income, 
when they are old. To introduce asymmetric information into the model, we assume that the 
realized project returns can be costlessly observed only by the borrower who operates the 
project and the auditing effort by the lender would cost him δ  (in terms of capital goods) 
per unit of loan. 
 The government in our model collects both capital income and wage income taxes at 
the flat rates of ρτ  and wτ , respectively, to finance a public spending that is equal to a 
constant fraction, α , of the aggregate output. The wages of the young lenders and young 
borrowers are taxed at the rate of wτ , while the returns from produced capital, net of 
interest repayments, of the old borrowers and the interest income of old lenders are taxed at 
the rate of ρτ .  
 Finally, the output in period t is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
γγ −
=
1)( tttt LHAKY ,  0 < γ  < 1     (1) 
where tK  and tL  are the aggregate capital and labor, respectively and tH  represents 
the stock of knowledge which acts as an Harrod-neutral technology progress parameter. 
Following the endogenous growth literature, we postulate that tt KH =  so that the 
economy exhibits increasing returns to scale and sustainable growth in the long run. Since 
both young lenders and young borrowers are endowed with labor supply and the total 
population size is normalized to a unity measure (i.e., tL =1), the aggregate output becomes 
tt AKY = , and the competitive rental rate of capital and wage rate of labor are equal to, 
respectively: 
tt AKw )1( γ−= ,       (2) 
At γρ = .         (3) 
To simplify the equilibrium dynamics path later on, it is also assumed that capital 
depreciates completely after one period of use.  
 
III.  The Equilibrium Loan Contract 
 
Since a young borrower’s expected payoff is strictly increasing with the size of the 
investment project, he will approach a lender for extra investment funds. The credit market 
in this model operates as follows. In each period, funds (wages of young lenders) flow from 
lenders to borrowers (within the same cohort) in the form of standard loan contracts, 
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through either direct or intermediated lending.7 Since a borrower’s project returns zero 
when it fails, the borrower in such a state will have to default on the loan previously 
borrowed. Given the asymmetric information pertaining to a project’s return realizations, ex 
post monitoring/auditing by the lender is necessary to prevent a borrower from claiming 
default regardless of his project’s actual outcome. Therefore, the loan contract offered to a 
borrower at time t  can be characterized by ),,( tttt qRC φ= , where tR (>0) is the (gross) 
loan rate, tq (>0) is the loan size, and tφ (>0) is the probability of monitoring when default 
is claimed. In the event of monitoring, a borrower will be penalized by forfeiting all his 
income if he is caught of under reporting. As is customary in the literature, we will focus on 
the equilibrium contract that induces truthful revelation of their projects’ returns by 
borrowers.  
In each period, the large number of lenders competes to offer the most favorable loan 
contracts to borrowers, subject to the standard constraints. Given the loan contract of 
),,( tttt qRC φ=  and the tax rate on capital income of ρτ  and the tax rate on labor income 
wτ , a representative borrower’s expected payoff (under truthful revelation) can be written 
as  
))(1)(1( 1 tttt qRQ −−− +κρτpi ρ       (4) 
where tQ  is the total amount of project investment by the borrower, consisting of both 
internal funds (his after-tax wage income) and external loans, that is, ttwt qwQ +−= )1( τ . 
A number of constraints needs be satisfied in the credit market equilibrium. First, to induce 
truthful revelation, an incentive compatibility condition should hold. Since tR >0, a 
borrower with failed project will obviously not have any incentive to report otherwise. Thus, 
we only need the following constraint that ensures the truthful revelation for borrowers with 
successful projects: 
    (5) 
 
This constraint says that the payoffs, net of interest payments, from truthful reporting to a 
borrower with successful project are greater than or equal to the payoffs if he lies about his 
                                                 
7
 Whether the loans are resulted from one-to-one lender-borrower relationships as in Bencivenga and Smith 
(1993) and Ho and Wang (2007) or intermediated as in Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) 
does not affect the aggregate dynamics we study later. However, at the individual level, direct lending will 
lead to state-dependent old age consumption for lenders, while intermediated lending would allow lenders 
to achieve complete insurance against such state-dependency in old age consumption since there is no 
aggregate uncertainty.  
ttttttt QqRQ 11 )1()( ++ −≥− κρφκρ
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project outcome and successfully evades the ex post monitoring by the lender. Second, the 
competition among lenders will drive the economic profit of a lender to zero. Given the 
opportunity cost of his funds and the monitoring cost, the lender’s zero profit condition is 
given by  
[ ] ttttt qqR εδρpiφpiτ ρ =−−− +1)1()1( ,     (6) 
where the left-hand-side is the expected net (after tax) income from the loan and the 
right-hand-side is the opportunity cost of the loan. Third, the inequality below is required to 
ensure the participation by borrowers in the credit market:  
tt R≥+1κρ .         (7) 
Finally, the following feasibility constraint on loan size should be satisfied: 
twt wq )1( τ−≤ .       (8) 
 We can thus define the equilibrium loan contract at time t as determined by selecting 
),,( tttt qRC φ=  to maximize (4), subject to (5) – (8), for given tax rates of ρτ  and wτ  
and factor prices of tw  and 1+tρ . Such an equilibrium contract can be readily solved, 
under the following additional technical assumptions, 
0)1( >−− piδκpi          (9) 
and 
[ ] ετpiδκpiγ ρ 2)1()1(22 >−−−A       (10) 
which are satisfied with a large enough κ , a small enough ε . 
 To solve for the equilibrium contract, we first note that the incentive compatibility 
constraint (5) will be binding in equilibrium, as has been well recognized in this type of 
problems. One can then easily derive the equilibrium loan rate and monitoring probability 
from the binding constraint of (5), the zero-profit condition of (6), and a binding feasibility 
constraint of (8) as, respectively, 
[ ] )1()1(2
2
ρτpiδκpi
εκ
−−−
=≡ RRt ,      (11) 
[ ] )1()1(2 ρτpiδκpiγ
εφφ
−−−
=≡
At .     (12) 
The technical conditions of (9) and (10) ensure that 0>R  and 10 << φ . In addition, 
since the participation constraint (7) holds with strict inequality under (9) and (10), a 
borrower would like to borrow as much as possible; implying that the feasibility constraint 
(8) indeed binds. Thus, for the given parameter values, the equilibrium loan contract at time 
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t, ),,( tttt qRC φ= , is given by (8) with equality, (11), and (12). 
 We can then obtain from (12) an interesting and important result that the equilibrium 
monitoring probability φ  increases with the tax rate on capital income. This result arises 
from the fact that increasing capital income taxation will lead to greater incentives for 
borrowers with successful projects to report project failures instead, as they would have to 
pay a higher loan rate required by lenders to compensate for the loss of revenue due to the 
higher taxation. Consequently, more frequent monitoring is required to keep the incentive 
compatibility constraint binding. To the extent that the ex post monitoring represents a form 
of credit market inefficiency, our result suggests that capital income taxation worsens the 
credit market distortions by inducing a greater deadweight loss associated with wasteful 
monitoring activities.  
 
IV. Optimal Taxation: Growth Maximizing  
 
  We now explore in this section the impact of capital income taxation, via the credit 
market channel, on capital accumulation and growth. To this end, we first derive the 
equilibrium dynamics of aggregate capital stock.  
 Under the given return structure of the capital-producing projects and the equilibrium 
contracts described in the previous sections, the aggregate capital stock in the economy 
evolves according to the following equation: 
[ ] twt wK )1()1(21 τpiφδκpi −−−=+ .     (13) 
Making use of (2), we can obtain the following constant growth rate of capital stock: 
[ ] )1()1(2)1(1 w
t
t A
K
K
g τpiφδκpiγ −−−−=≡ + .    (14) 
Such simplified economic dynamics in the model economy is largely due to the AK-type of 
production function, which makes the wage rate proportional to the capital stock, and the 
linear return structure of the capital-producing projects in the model.  
 On the other hand, under the equilibrium loan contract, the government’s budget 
constraint in period t can be written as  
 
[ ]
[ ] .)1()1(25.0
)1(5.0}])1[(){1(5.0
1
111111
−
−−−−−−
−−−+=
−−+−+−−+=
twttw
tttttttwttwt
ww
qRqRqwwY
τpiφδκpiρττ
piφδρpiττκρpiττα
ρ
ρρ
 
 
Substituting the factor prices in (2) and (3), as well as (13), into the above equation, the 
government budget constraint can be rewritten as  
 9 
ργττγα 5.0)1( +−= w .       (15) 
This way of writing the government budget constraint is quite revealing with regard to the 
intuition pointed out in the previous studies of similar models that capital income taxation is 
growth promoting. This is because, from (15), it is clear that an increase in the tax rate on 
capital income, ρτ , will be accompanied by a decrease in the tax rate on labor income, wτ . 
This results in higher after-tax labor income out of which young individuals can (and will) 
save, which in turn translates into faster capital accumulation and growth.  
 Substituting (15) into (14), we have  
[ ] )
1
5.0
1()1(2)1(
γ
γτα
piφδκpiγ ρ
−
−
−−−−= Ag ,     (16) 
or, equivalently,  
[ ] )1(ln)1(2ln)
1
5.0
1ln(ln γpiφδκpi
γ
αγτ ρ
−+−−+
−
−
+= Ag .   (17) 
Therefore, increasing capital income taxation generates two opposing effects on growth. 
The first term on the right-hand-side of (17) reflects the beneficial effect through increasing 
loan supply that has been previously argued. More importantly, recalling (12), the second 
term on the right-hand-side of (17) captures the role of asymmetric information: a higher 
taxation on capital income introduces a negative effect on growth by worsening credit 
market distortions as it induces more frequent costly auditing.  
It is worth to note that, if there is no information asymmetry in this model ( 0=δ ), the 
second term on the right-hand-side of (17) will become a constant and hence the previous 
result that the growth rate is monotonically increasing in the capital income tax, as in Uhlig 
and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballé (1998), will be restored.8 However, in the presence of 
asymmetric information, i.e., 0>δ , it follows from (17) that the relationship between 
capital income taxation and growth in the economy is non-monotonic. In fact, it can be 
shown that this relationship is hump shaped: the growth rate rises initially with the capital 
income taxation but eventually declines when the tax rate on capital income, and 
consequently the induced credit market distortions, becomes too high.  
 To explicitly solve for the tax rate on capital income that maximizes growth, one can 
obtain the following first order condition from (17): 
                                                 
8
 In this case, the optimal policy is to set the capital income tax as high as possible. Since the technical 
condition (10) is needed to ensure borrowers’ participation in the loan market, the highest possible tax rate 
on capital when δ=0 is given by ])1(2/[1 2 κpiγε −− A  (< 1). 
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0)1(2)1/()5.0(1
)1/(5.0ln
=
∂
∂
⋅
−−
−
−−+
−
=
∂
∂
ρρρ τ
φ
piφδκpi
piδ
γαγτ
γγ
τ
g
. 
Recalling the determination of φ  from (12), we can solve the optimal ρτ  as 
[ ]piδκpiκpi
piδεγα
γ
τ
ρ
−−−
−−
−= )1(2)1(
)5.01(11*
A
.     (18) 
Furthermore, to ensure (18) is indeed a maximum solution, one can readily verify that the 
following second order condition holds: 
[ ] [ ] 0)1(2)()1(2)5.01(
25.0ln
2
2
2
2
22
2
2
2
2
<
∂
∂
−−
−
∂
∂
−−
−
−+−
−=
∂
∂
ρρρρ τ
φ
δpiφκpi
δpi
τ
φ
δpiφκpi
piδ
αγτγ
γ
τ
g
. 
It is clear from (18) that 1* <ρτ . Under the parameter configurations satisfying (9), (10) 
and a sufficiently small α  to guarantee that 05.01 >−− γα  holds, it is easy to show that  
[ ]
*
2
2* 1)1(2)1(
)5.01()1(
ρρ
τ
piδκpiκpiγ
piδεγα
τ −<
−−−
−−
=−
A
, 
which implies that 0* >ρτ . Thus, the optimal tax rate on capital income in our model is 
well defined, satisfying 10 * << ρτ .  
 Thus, we can readily obtain from (18) the key implication of our analysis: the credit 
market friction lowers the optimal taxation on capital income. This can be seen in two ways. 
Firstly, in the presence of asymmetric information in the credit market (δ > 0), the optimal 
tax rate on capital income is lower than its counterpart in the case with full information. 
Secondly, it is clear that the optimal tax rate on capital income is decreasing in the severity 
of asymmetric information in the credit market ( 0/* <∂∂ δτ ρ ). The intuition for these two 
observations is as follows. Since capital income taxation worsens the credit market 
distortions originated from the information asymmetry, one needs be more conservative in 
setting the tax rate on capital in order to avoid causing excessive credit market distortions, 
in addition to that caused by the information asymmetry directly, and the subsequent 
adverse effects on growth. From the policy perspective, our analysis suggests that countries 
with severe asymmetric information in their credit markets should tax relatively less on 
capital income.  
It follows from substituting (18) into (12) that the optimal auditing probability is given 
by 
[ ]piδκpipiδγα
κεpiφ
−−−−
−
= )1(2)5.01(
)1(*
A
,     (19) 
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which can be easily shown to be decreasing with the informational cost of δ when 
piκpiδ /)1(0 −<< , which is satisfied under condition (9). This negative relationship 
implies that, as the credit market frictions worsen, economies should adopt more relaxed 
auditing policies (by lowering φ ). Intuitively, on the one hand, the worsening of 
asymmetric information calls for a more stringent auditing policy in order to keep the 
incentive compatibility condition in check. On the other hand, as a greater credit market 
friction lowers the optimal tax rate on capital and hence lessens the incentive problem in the 
credit market, less auditing is required. The negative relationship arises since, for a small 
enoughδ , the second consideration always dominates. 
Furthermore, with the tax rate on capital and the auditing probability determined 
optimally as in (18) and (19), respectively, it follows from (16) that the optimal growth rate 
is given by 
[ ] 





−
−
−





−−−−
−
−−−=
γ
γτα
piδκpiγα
κεpiδpi
κpiγ ρ
1
5.0
1)1(2)5.01(
)1()1(2)1(
*
*
A
Ag  
Since 0/* <∂∂ δτ ρ , it is easy to see that 0/* <∂∂ δg . Thus, not surprisingly, the optimal 
growth rate in the model economy decreases with the extent of the credit market friction. 
While beyond the scope of the present paper, the above implications can be potentially 
testable once appropriate proxies are available. Assuming governments are setting the 
taxation policy (and the auditing probability) optimally to maximize growth, one can expect 
to observe in cross-country data that the tax rate on capital, the growth rate and the intensity 
of auditing are negatively correlated with the extent of market friction.   
 
V. Optimal Taxation: Welfare Maximizing 
 
 In this section, we examine the optimal taxation policy from the welfare point of view. 
Some studies in the literature have examined both on growth-maximizing and welfare- 
maximizing taxation policies, and have obtained different results. For example, while the 
growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing tax rates are found to be the same in Barro 
(1990), there are divergences between the two in Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993), 
Lau (1995), and Penalosa and Turnovsky (2005). Thus, two questions are of particular 
interest here. One is whether or not the welfare-maximizing taxation policy in our model 
will be the same as one derived in the previous section that maximizes growth. The other is 
whether or not the presence of credit market friction will again lower the optimal taxation 
on capital in the case of welfare maximization. 
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Since agents in our model only consume when they are old, the welfare calculation for 
each generation needs only focus on the payoffs to the members of that generation when 
they are old. Let tΠ  denotes the total payoffs to all members of generation t-1, in period t 
when they are old. Then the welfare of all generations can be expressed by  
∑
+∞
=
Π=+Π+Π+Π=Π 02
2
10 ... t t
tβββ , 
where 10 << β  is the discount rate (of the social planner).  
Recalling the population composition of generation t-1, the old in period t consists of a 
unit measure of lenders, a measurepi of borrowers with failed projects, and a measure pi−1  
of borrowers whose projects succeeded. Hence, based on the equilibrium contracts, the 
payoff to all lenders of generation t-1 is equal to 1)1( −− tw wτε  from the zero-profit 
condition of (6) and the binding resource constraint of (8). Since borrowers with failed 
projects receive zero payoffs, from the law of large numbers, the payoff to all borrowers of 
generation t-1 is given by: 
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Thus, recalling (2), (11), (12) and (13), the welfare of generation t-1 is equal to 
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Since the economy reaches the balanced growth path right away, whereby the capital 
stock grows a constant rate of g, the aggregate social welfare for all generations is 
represented by 
∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
−
−
=−=−=Π
0
0
0
0 1
)1(5.0)1(5.0)1(5.0
t
tt
t
t
t
g
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gAKAK β
τγβγτγτβ ρρρ ,  (20) 
where 0K  is the initial aggregate capital stock. Taking the logarithmic transformation of 
(20), we obtain 
( ) )1ln()1ln(5.0lnln 0 gAK βτγ ρ −−−+=Π . 
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The welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital must satisfy the first order condition:  
0
11
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where g is the growth rate given by (16) in the previous section.  
It follows then that the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital income (call it **ρτ ) must 
be smaller than the growth-maximizing rate (call it *ρτ ), because 0
ln
*
<
∂
Π∂
= ρρ ττ
ρτ
 and g is 
a concave function of ρτ .
9
 In addition, utilizing the first order condition and the concavity 
of g, it is easy to check that the second order condition also holds at **ρρ ττ = : 
0
1
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2
2
2
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g
g
. 
We can glean the intuition for the result of *** ρρ ττ <  from examining (20). The effect of 
capital income tax on the social welfare can be decomposed into two components: one is 
the effect on the initial generation of the old and the other is on all future generations. It is 
obvious that capital income taxation reduces the welfare of the initial old, to whom the 
capital income accrues. It is also clear from (20) that capital income taxation affects the 
welfare of all future generations through its effect on the growth rate g. Thus, capital 
income taxation generates one additional negative effect on the welfare, comparing to those 
on the growth rate. Consequently, the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital is lower than 
its counterpart in growth maximization.10 
 To see whether the presence of the credit market friction also lower the welfare- 
maximizing tax rate on capital, by differentiating the first order condition with respect to 
the informational cost δ, we can obtain the following:  
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Since *** ρρ ττ < , the concavity of g with respect to ρτ  implies that 0
**
>
∂
∂
= ρρ ττ
ρτ
g
. In 
addition, one can show from (12) and (14) that 0<
∂
∂
δ
g
 and 0
2
<
∂∂
∂
ρτδ
g
. It then follows 
                                                 
9
 The concavity of g in τρ can be shown from (16) and noting that φ  is given by (12). 
10
 It is worth to point out that this result does not arise from the presence of asymmetric information in our 
model. It is rather easy to see that the same result holds when δ = 0. Indeed, this result, and intuition of it, is 
similar to those in Futagami, Morita, and Shibata (1993) and Lau (1995).  
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that 0
**
<
∂
∂
δ
τ ρ
, i.e., the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital indeed falls as the 
informational cost rises.   
 
To summarize, though we cannot solve for the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital 
analytically, we can conclude this section with the following two results based on the above 
analysis. First, the welfare-maximizing and the growth-maximizing tax rates on capital are 
different in our model, with the former being lower than the latter. Second, the argument 
that taxation on capital income should be reduced by the presence of information friction in 
the credit market also holds from the welfare point of view.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
Instead of assuming a simple conversion process from consumption goods to capital 
goods as in typical macroeconomic models, we take a more serious approach with regard to 
the process of capital accumulation by assuming that capital is produced by risky projects 
that are financed internally by wage income and externally through a credit market with 
informational friction. Specifically, we have analyzed the growth and welfare implications 
of capital vs. labor taxation in a setting where borrowers have private information regarding 
the investment project realizations and state verifications by lenders are costly. Under this 
information structure, equilibrium loan contracts require a positive probability of ex post 
verification to induce truth-telling from borrowers, and hence give rise to credit market 
distortions as verification is costly. It is shown that the credit market distortions are 
worsened by increasing taxation on capital income, as it leads to greater monitoring efforts, 
and thus deadweight losses, to keep the incentive compatibility condition in check. It is 
because this added market inefficiency caused by capital income taxation, that we found it 
not optimal to set the tax rate on capital to be as high as possible, contrasting to the result 
established in previous studies of the similar models without informational frictions. Indeed, 
both the growth-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing tax rates on capital are found to 
be strictly less than one and decreasing with the extent of the credit market friction. From 
the policy perspective, our analysis yields the following cross-country implications: (i) 
economies with more severe problem of information asymmetry in marketplace should 
impose a smaller tax rate on capital income; and (ii) auditing requirements or, loosely 
speaking, contract enforcement should be made more lax as the market frictions worsen.  
Comparing to Ho and Wang (2007), the present paper makes several new contributions. 
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First, we extend the former analysis to an environment in which capital-producing projects 
are financed by both internal and external funds, where the external funds are intermediated 
through a credit market that is plagued with costly state verification – a widely discussed 
form of credit market imperfection in the literature. Even though we find the same 
qualitative implication about the optimal taxation on capital, we think the current study is 
still important and useful as a formal robustness check with regard to different model 
specifications and different information structures. Second, not only that information 
asymmetry can be of different forms, these different varieties of informational frictions are 
likely to coexist in the marketplace at the same time. In such a likely event, our present 
analysis then can be interpreted as providing an additional channel through which 
informational frictions justify a low taxation on capital income. Third, while Ho and Wang 
(2007) only focuses on the optimal taxation from the standpoint of economic growth, the 
present paper includes a formal analysis on the optimal taxation policy from the welfare 
perspective as well. In this connection, our result here regarding the welfare-maximizing 
taxation policy further strengthens the previous call for a more conservative tax policy on 
capital income in the presence of credit market frictions. 
When the credit market, through which capital-producing projects are financed, is 
plagued with asymmetric information, taxation on capital creates a distortion in borrowers’ 
incentives insofar it leads to greater tendency to cheating behavior. To counter this 
increased likelihood for cheating, more stringent contract enforcement is then needed.  
Consequently, since enforcement is costly, capital income taxation generates additional 
deadweight losses in terms of economic resources, growth, and welfare. On the whole, our 
analysis here presents a robust argument for lowering capital income taxation in the 
presence of credit market frictions. 
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